Globalization, Inequality, and the Rich Countries of the G-20: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) by Smeeding, Timothy M.
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Center for Policy Research Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
2002 
Globalization, Inequality, and the Rich Countries of the G-20: 
Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
Timothy M. Smeeding 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/cpr 
 Part of the International Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Smeeding, Timothy M., "Globalization, Inequality, and the Rich Countries of the G-20: Evidence from the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)" (2002). Center for Policy Research. 112. 
https://surface.syr.edu/cpr/112 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public 
Affairs at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Center for Policy Research by an authorized administrator 
of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
ISSN: 1525-3066 
 
 
 
 
Center for Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 53 
 
 
 
 
GLOBALIZATION, INEQUALITY, AND THE RICH COUNTRIES OF THE G-20:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE LUXEMBOURG INCOME STUDY (LIS) 
 
 
Timothy M. Smeeding 
 
 
 
 
Center for Policy Research 
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
Syracuse University 
426 Eggers Hall 
Syracuse, New York 13244-1020 
(315) 443-3114 | Fax (315) 443-1081 
e-mail: ctrpol@syr.edu 
 
 
 
 
March 2003 
 
 
$5.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Up-to-date information about CPR’s research projects and other activities is available 
from our World Wide Web site at www-cpr.maxwell.syr.edu. All recent working 
papers and Policy Briefs can be read and/or printed from there as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH – Spring 2003 
 
Timothy Smeeding, Director 
Professor of Economics & Public Administration 
__________ 
 
Associate Directors 
 
Margaret Austin Douglas Holtz-Eakin 
Associate Director, Professor of Economics 
Budget and Administration Associate Director, Center for Policy Research 
  
Douglas Wolf John Yinger 
Professor of Public Administration Professor of Economics and Public Administration 
Associate Director, Aging Studies Program Associate Director, Metropolitan Studies Program 
 
SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATES 
 
Scott Allard............................. Public Administration 
Dan Black............................................... Economics 
Arthur Brooks ........................ Public Administration 
Stacy Dickert-Conlin............................... Economics 
William Duncombe ................. Public Administration 
Gary Engelhardt ................... ................. Economics 
Deborah Freund................... . Public Administration 
Vernon Greene .................... . Public Administration 
Madonna Harrington Meyer .....................Sociology 
Christine Himes........................................Sociology 
William C. Horrace .................................Economics 
Bernard Jump ........................Public Administration 
Duke Kao ...............................................Economics 
Eric Kingson......................... ............... Social Work 
Thomas Kniesner ................. .................Economics 
Jeff Kubik............................................... Economics 
Andrew London ....................................... Sociology  
Jerry Miner .............................................Economics 
John Moran .......................... .................Economics 
Jan Ondrich ........................................... Economics 
John Palmer ...........................Public Administration 
Lori Ploutz-Snyder .. Health and Physical Education 
Jeff Racine ............................................ Economics 
Grant Reeher.................................Political Science 
Stuart Rosenthal................... .................Economics 
Michael Wasylenko................................ Economics 
Janet Wilmoth.......................................... Sociology 
 
 
GRADUATE ASSOCIATES 
 
Anna Amirkhanyan.................Public Administration 
Beth Ashby.............................................Economics 
Eldar Beiseitov ......................................Economics 
Caroline Bourdeaux ...............Public Administration 
Christine Caffrey ......................................Sociology 
Gabby Chapman....................................Economics 
Yong Chen .............................................Economics 
Seng Eun Choi ......................................Economics 
Carrie Cochran.......................Public Administration 
Christopher Cunningham .......................Economics 
Sarah Douglas .......................Public Administration 
Tae Ho Eom...........................Public Administration 
Ying Fang ................................................Sociology 
Amy Fedigan..........................Public Administration 
Jose Galdo.............................................Economics 
Andrzej Grodner.....................................Economics 
Glenda Gross...........................................Sociology 
 
Jerry Kalarickal ..................................... Economics 
Anil Kumar............................................. Economics 
Kristina Lambright ................. Public Administration 
Xiaoli Liang............................................ Economics 
Liqun Liu ............................................... Economics 
Alison Louie........................... Public Administration 
Joseph Marchand.................................. Economics 
Cristian Meghea ................................... Economics 
Emily Pas ............................................. Economics 
Adriana Sandu....................... Public Administration 
Jon Schwabish .....................................Economics 
Claudia Smith ........................................Economics 
Sara Smits ..............................................Sociology 
Lora Walters .........................Public Administration 
Wen Wang.............................Public Administration 
James Williamson..................................Economics  
Bo Zhao.................................................Economics 
 
 
STAFF
 
Kelly Bogart ....................... Administrative Secretary 
Martha Bonney....... Publications/Events Coordinator 
Karen Cimilluca............. Librarian/Office Coordinator 
Kim Desmond ................... Administrative Secretary 
Kati Foley .....................Administrative Assistant, LIS 
Emily NaPier ..............Senior Secretary/Receptionist 
Kitty Nasto.......................... Administrative Secretary 
Candi Patterson.......................Computer Consultant 
Denise Paul ..........................Editorial Assistant, NTJ 
Mary Santy .........................Administrative Secretary 
Mindy Tanner .....................Administrative Secretary 
 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to summarize and comment upon what we know about the 
determinants of both the level and trend in economic inequality over the past two decades, and to 
relate these findings to the progress of globalization in these nations. While the fruits of 
economic progress in rich nations have not been equally spread, we argue that most citizens in 
rich Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations have benefited 
from the trend toward global economic progress. We begin with a summary of the differences in 
overall economic inequality within the G-20 nations based on LIS (Luxembourg Income Study) 
data and recent work by others. Here we find that social policies, wage distributions, time 
worked, social and labor market institutions and demographic differences all have some 
influence on why there are large differences in inequality among rich nations at any point in 
time. In contrast, trade policy has not been shown to have any major impact on economic 
inequality. 
Next, we turn to trends in inequality. We find modest and sometimes dissimilar changes 
in the distribution of income have taken place within most advanced nations, with most finding a 
higher level of inequality in the mid-to-late 1990s than in the 1980s. Inequality, however, has not 
risen markedly in some nations (e.g., Denmark, Germany, France, and Canada) over this period, 
while its rise has slowed in several other nations during the late 1990s. The explanations for 
rising inequality in rich countries are many, and no one single set of explanations is ultimately 
convincing. In particular, there is no evidence that we know of that trade and globalization is bad 
for rich countries. 
This suggests that rising economic inequality is not inevitable, or that it necessarily hurts 
low skill-low income families. Rather it suggests that globalization does not force any single 
outcome on any country. Domestic policies and institutions still have large effects on the level 
and trend of inequality within rich and middle-income nations, even in a globalizing world 
economy. 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction: Cross-National Studies of Income Distribution 
Increasingly, the rich and poor nations of the world face a common set of social and 
economic trends and policy issues: the cost of population aging, changing family structures 
(including a growing number of single parent families in many nations), the growing majority of 
two-earner families, increasing numbers of immigrants from poorer nations. In particular most 
rich and middle-income nations are experiencing rising economic inequality generated by skill-
biased technological change (marked by rising returns to higher labor market skills), 
international trade and other factors related to the globalization, of the world economy. While   
increasing economic inequality is not inevitable, and while public policy and labor market 
institutions can help prevent many of the downside effects of these trends, the facts of the matter 
are that income inequality has continued to increase in the large majority of the world’s rich 
nations, over the past decade (Atkinson 2000; Friedman 2000; Gottschalk, Gustafsson, and 
Palmer 1997; Smeeding and Grodner 2000). All of these rich nations have also designed systems 
of social protection to shield their citizens against the risk of a fall in economic status due to 
unemployment, divorce, disability, retirement, and death of a spouse. The interaction of 
economic and demographic forces and social programs generates the distribution of net 
disposable income in each of these nations. 
 The recent evidence on the level and trend in economic and social inequality in rich and 
middle-income nations is the major topic of this brief paper. The emergence and availability of 
cross-nationally comparable databases has put us in a position to directly compare the 
experiences of rich nations in coping with the growth of market income inequality, and to begin 
to add middle-income nations as well. Additional comparable data of the type called for by the 
 
 
Canberra Report (Canberra Group 2001) will also allow better studies of this same type in 
coming years for a wider still range of countries. 
 The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) project has pioneered the availability of online data 
that allows researchers to use microdata to measure inequality and to test their ideas and 
hypotheses about the sources and causes of that inequality using modern methods. One of the 
major purposes of this paper is to update the facts and figures in these reports by presenting 
evidence on the level and trend in income inequality as portrayed by the LIS data, and from other 
sources. We begin with a brief review of methodology. Then we turn briefly to the results for 
level of inequality. Trends in inequality come next and they are often more difficult to precisely 
assess than are levels, whether using LIS or other sources. We also include a brief discussion of 
recent research on the determinants of these levels and trends. 
 Comparisons of these experiences may help us to understand how one nation is similar to 
and different from other nations. It may also help us trace these differences to their economic 
demographic, and policy-related sources. The institutions, which emerge in nations to help 
mitigate the forces of market-driven economic inequality, are also of interest. Global trade will 
benefit some groups and hurt (at least temporarily) some others, even when the overall benefits 
exceed the costs for any nation as a whole (Friedman 2000).  Too often we forget that greater 
trade brings with it wider choices, better products, and better prices which benefit all citizens, 
regardless of their personal changes in earnings or incomes. 
 Cross-national research has also taught us that every nation must design its own set of social 
and economic policies tempered by its institutions, values, culture, and politics. And the 
conclusions of this paper are that these national policies continue to matter greatly.  
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II.  Measuring Economic Inequality: The Basics 
Here we briefly review the sources of our evidence and their strengths and weaknesses. 
There is currently a set of international standards for income distribution that parallel the 
international standards used for systems of national income accounts, that have been pioneered 
by the Canberra Group (2001).1 The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), which underlies much of 
this paper and the initial findings of the Canberra group, offers a place to start with these 
analyses. In fact the LIS definition of annual disposable income is the starting point from which 
this paper begins. LIS offers the reader many choices of perspective in terms of country, income 
measure, accounting unit, and time frame. But its relatively short time frame (1979-1997 for 
most nations, but 1968-1997 for five countries), and limited number of observation periods per 
country (three to five periods per country at present), currently limits its usefulness for studying 
longer-term trends in income distribution. The purpose of this section of the paper is to explain 
the choices we have made in our use of LIS. The choices we, and others, have made to study 
longer-term trends in income distribution are more fully discussed in Gottschalk and Smeeding 
(1997, 2000) and Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995). It is important to note also that 
these income definitions are also the ones that have been initially used by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) in their work on this topic (Szeleky and Hilgert 1999a, 1999b) and are 
the starting point for the Canberra Group (2001) work on cross nationally comparable income 
data.   
 Our attention is focused here on the distribution of disposable money income that is cash 
and near-cash money income, including earnings of all household members, after direct taxes 
and including transfer payments. Several points should be noted about this choice: 
• income rather than consumption is taken as the indicator of economic well-being. Wealth 
is ignored except to the extent that it is represented by cash interest, rent, and dividends. 
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While for developing countries, consumption is liable to be a better definition and also 
very close to disposable income, we use income here; 
• the LIS definition of income falls considerably short of a comprehensive definition, 
typically excluding much of capital gains, imputed rents, and most income in-kind (with 
the exception of near-cash benefits and the measurement of home production in Mexico 
and Russian LIS surveys; Canberra Report 2001, chapter 8). But it is also much wider 
than the distribution of wages or earnings per worker used in much of the globalization 
literature; 
• no account is taken of indirect taxes or of the benefits from public spending (other than 
cash and near-cash transfers) such as those from health care, education, or most housing 
subsidies; 
• the period of income measurement is in general the calendar year with income measured 
on an annual basis.2 
 Thus, variables measured may be less than ideal and results may not be fully comparable 
across countries. For example, it might be that one country may help low-income families 
through money benefits (included in cash income), whereas another provides subsidized housing, 
childcare, or education (which is not taken into account). And some types of benefits, e.g., 
education, may have quite different effects on longer-term national well-being. While one study 
(Smeeding, et al. 1993) finds that the distribution of housing, education, and health care benefits 
reinforces the general differences in income distribution for a subset of the western nations 
examined there, there is no guarantee that these relationships hold for alternative countries or 
methods of accounting (Gardiner, et al. 1995), nor that they are stable over a longer time frame. 
In fact, most studies show that countries, which spend more for cash benefits, tend to also spend 
more for noncash benefits. Because noncash benefits are more equally distributed than are cash 
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benefits, levels of inequality within high noncash spending countries are lessened, but the same 
rank ordering of these countries, with respect to inequality levels that are found here using cash 
alone, persists when noncash benefits are added in. And while we use income, not consumption, 
as the basis for our comparisons, due to the relative ease of measurement and comparability of 
the former, there is evidence that consumption inequalities are similar to income inequalities in 
major European nations and in the United States (Hagenaars, deVos, and Zaidi 1998; Johnson 
and Smeeding 1997). 
 The distribution of disposable income requires answers to both the “what” and the “among 
whom” questions. Regarding the former, earned income from wages, salaries, self-employment, 
cash property income (but not capital gains or losses), and other private cash income transfers 
(occupational pensions, alimony, and child support) or “market income,” is the primary source of 
disposable income for most families. To reach the disposable income concept used in this paper, 
we add public transfer payments (social retirement, family allowances, unemployment 
compensation, income support benefits) and deduct personal income tax and social security 
contributions from market income. Near-cash benefits—those that are virtually equivalent to 
cash (food stamps in the United States and housing allowances in the United Kingdom and 
Sweden)—are also included in the disposable income measure used here. 
 The question of distribution “among whom” is answered “among individuals.” When 
assessing disposable income inequality, however, the unit of aggregation is the household: the 
incomes of all household members are aggregated and then divided by an equivalence scale to 
arrive at individual equivalent income. The equivalence scale used in the square root of 
household size and all LIS-based income measures in this paper use this equivalence scale and 
the “adjusted disposable income” concept which is produced by dividing (unadjusted) disposable 
income by family size raised to the power .5 (square root of family size). This is the same scale 
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used in Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995) (see also, Buhmann, Rainwater, Schmaus, 
and Smeeding 1988). 
 For the most part, the household—all persons sharing the same housing unit regardless of 
familial relationship—is the common unit of analysis.3 Complete intra-household income sharing 
is assumed, despite the fact that members of the same household probably do not equally share in 
all household resources. To assume that unrelated individuals living with others do not at all 
share in common household incomes or household “public goods” (heat, durables, etc.) is a 
worse assumption in our judgment. Thus, our unit of account is the household. 
 The approach adopted here, based in large part on data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS), overcomes some, but not all, of the problems of making comparisons across countries and 
across time that plagued earlier studies. Some problems, for example, the use of data from 
different types of sources, still remain. But all of the data used in the analysis of levels of 
inequality are drawn from household income surveys, or their equivalent, and in no case is 
synthetic data used. One major advantage of LIS is the availability of micro-data. The aim of the 
LIS project has been to assemble a single database containing survey data from many countries 
that is as consistent as possible. Access to the micro-data means that it is possible to produce 
results on the same basis, starting from individual household records, and to test their sensitivity 
to alternative choices of units, definition, and other concepts. It is therefore possible to make any 
desired adjustment for household size. Aggregate adjustments, such as that from pre-tax (market 
income) to post-tax (disposable) income are not necessary, although in some cases imputations 
are necessary at the household level. The data all cover, at least in principle, the whole non-
institutionalized population though the treatment of immigrants may differ across nations. These 
data are supplemented here by data provided by one major nation not yet a member of LIS 
(Japan) where a national expert calculated income inequality measures with the consultation of 
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the LIS staff (Ishikawa 1996), and by a recent LIS paper which adds Latin America estimates of 
similarly defined disposable income (Szekely and Hilgert 1999a; 1999b). The rest of the 
calculations were made by the author and the LIS project team. Many of the results cited here are 
directly available from the LIS home page’s key figures section 
(http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures/ineqtable.htm).  
 While the aim of the LIS project is to increase the degree of cross-national comparability, 
complete cross-national comparability is not possible, even if we were to administer our own 
surveys in each nation. Comparability is a matter of degree, and all that one can hope for is to 
reach an acceptably high level. In economic and statistical terms, the data is noisy, but the ratio 
of signal to noise is reduced by LIS. Ultimately, the reader must decide the acceptability of the 
evidence before them. To skeptics, we can offer that most of the cross-national results provided 
here have been reviewed by a team of national experts—statisticians, social scientists, and policy 
analysts—prior to their publication by the United Nations, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and in other forums, and they have appeared in refereed 
journals. And, because the LIS data is ultimately available to the research community at zero 
economic cost, researchers are free to repeat these calculations themselves. Moreover, recent 
attempts to mimic the LIS definitions by the IDB are used to demonstrate the value of these 
techniques for a wider range of nations, such as the G-20. 
 
III.  Comparing Levels of Inequality at a Point in Time 
 The LIS data sets are used here to compare the distribution of disposable income in 26 or 
more nations during the 1990s. We focus here on relative (Figure 1) income differences, not 
absolute income differences.4 The relative inequality patterns found here correspond roughly to 
the results found in Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995), which use earlier years’ LIS 
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data in most cases. Our choices of inequality measures are four: the ratio of the income of the 
person at the bottom and top 10th percentiles to the median, P10 and P90, respectively; the ratio of 
the income of the person at the 90th percentile to the person at the 10th percentile—the decile 
ratio—(a measure of “social distance”); and the gini coefficient. 
Relative Differences in Inequality Across Nations 
 We begin with a chart containing all four measures of inequality with the LIS nations 
ordered by the decile ratio from lowest to highest. At the bottom of Figure 1, we find Mexico 
with a low-income person at the 10th percentile in 1998 (P10) having an income that is 28 percent 
of the median, followed by Russia at 30 and the United States at 38. A high-income person at the 
90th percentile (P90), in contrast, has 328 percent of the median in Mexico, 282 percent in Russia 
and 214 percent in the United States. The Mexican, Russian, and United States decile ratios are 
11.55, 9.39 and 5.57, respectively, meaning the income of the typical high income person is 
more than 11.5, 9.3 or 5.5 times the income of the typical low-income person, even after we have 
adjusted for taxes, transfers, and family size. In contrast, the average low-income person has 49 
percent of the income of the middle person in the average country; the average rich person has 
195 percent as much, and the decile ratio shows an average “economic distance” between rich 
and poor of 4.2 times P10. 
 At the other end of the chart, a Swedish citizen at P10 has 60 percent of the median, the P90 
is 156 and the decile ratio is 2.61, less than one-half as large as the United States value, and one- 
quarter or less of the Russian or Mexican values. This evidence suggests that the range of 
inequality and of social distance between rich and poor in the rich and medium-income nations 
of the world is rather large in the mid-1990s. It also begs for comparable information for 
additional middle-income and developing nations of the world. 
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 Countries in Figure 1 fall into clusters, with inequality the least in Scandinavia (Finland, 
Sweden, Norway) and Northern Europe (Denmark, Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Here P10’s 
average 58 percent of the median and decile ratios are about 3.0 or less. The Czech Republic 
comes in about average here (though inequality has risen since this date by most accounts). We 
also note that there are no G-20 nations represented here.  
 Central Europe comes next (Germany, Belgium, Austria, and France) with decile ratios 
from 3.18 to 3.54, and ginis from .255 to .2.88. The figures for Germany include East Germany 
as well as West Germany. And the first two G-20 nations—Germany and France first appear 
(Table 1).  
 Taiwan is an anomalous entry in the middle of the table, with a gini (.277) and decile ratio 
(3.38) in the middle European range. Spain, Poland, and Switzerland also form a curious group 
in the middle. Canada appears next with a lower gini (.315) and decile ratio (4.13) than any other 
Anglo-Saxon nation and with less inequality than is found in Hungary, Ireland, Israel, or Italy. 
Japan has more or less the same income distribution characteristics, as does Canada, though the 
only estimate we have and trust is now a decade old. 
 Italy (4.77) and the English speaking countries of Australia (4.33) the United Kingdom 
(4.57), and the United States (5.54) come next with still higher levels of inequality. The highest 
levels of inequality and social distance that we can measure with good confidence are in Russia 
and Mexico. 
 While percentile ratios as measures of social distance have some obvious appeal (e.g., 
insensitivity to topcoding,5 ease of understanding), they have the disadvantage of focusing on 
only a few points in the distribution and lack a normative basis. Figure 1 presents an alternative 
more commonly employed Lorenz-based summary measure of inequality, the gini coefficient. 
As we saw above, relying on this measure, country rankings change little. Inequality is still 
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lowest in Scandinavia, then Central Europe, Southern Europe, and Asia with the English 
speaking countries (except for Canada) having the highest inequality, and the United States the 
highest among these, and then followed at last by Russia and Mexico. The other Central 
European nations show no clear pattern, and both Taiwan and Japan are close to the middle of 
the ranges displayed here. In sum, there is a wide range of inequality among rich and middle-
income nations covered by LIS. 
Just The 12 G-20 Nations 
We can add two more G-20 nations to the 10 in Figure 1, by including the two Latin 
American G-20 countries from the IDB data harmonized by Szekely and Hilgert (1999a, 1999b) 
to reach 12. We have grouped them geographically in Table 1, into five groups, with Latin 
America, European OECD nations, Anglo-Saxon OECD nations, Eastern Europe, and Asia (the 
latter two being represented by Russia and Japan alone). The range is now widened even further 
with Brazil and Argentina (albeit the urban areas only) having ginis of .571 and .442, 
respectively, though we suspect that the true level of inequality in Argentina is higher than that 
shown here due to omission of the rural areas in the Szekely and Hilgert database. The same 
clusters seem to hold, with Europe, then Asia (Japan), then the Anglo OECD countries, Russia 
and Latin America having the most inequality. 
There are no comparable, harmonized estimates for China, India, Indonesia, Korea, South 
Africa, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey (the other seven countries in the 19-nation G-20!). However, 
with a little work on the part of these nations and willingness to share their data with LIS and 
with other similar bodies—e.g., within the G-20 itself—even more comparable measures of 
overall inequality could be developed, and key nations such as China and India could be added to 
this table. Moreover, added observations for earlier years data could also be used to create time 
series for all of these nations. 
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That is, there exists a foundation of data sources from these nations and from the World 
Bank and other data providers, which could be mobilized and harmonized to better illustrate the 
level and trend in inequality in the entire G-20, and to better understand the policy issues which 
affect and are effected by globalization and increased trade within and across these economies. 
Explaining the Differences 
There have been few attempts to explain the differences we find in economic inequality 
across the rich nations (Jacobs and Gornick 2001; Jencks 2002; Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997, 
2000; Gustafsson and Johansson 1997), so what we have here is piecemeal, but still instructive 
explanation of initial explorations of these differences. 
First, it is important to note, that explanations of differences in inequality across countries 
differ according to which end of the income distribution one is addressing. That is, rather than 
ad-hoc decompositions of aggregate indices, often more can learned from addressing the 
explanations of the differences in incomes at each end of the income distribution separately. For 
instance, low incomes (10-50 ratios or poverty rates) are quite well correlated with the 
prevalence of low-wage workers within each nation (Figure 2) and with levels of non-elderly 
social transfers within each nation (Figure 3). The effects of different policies to raise wages, 
e.g., by administrative fiat (minimum wages) or by increasing labor productivity, are clearly 
raised by this relationship. 
Countries that have many jobs at low wages, United States, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom, tend to have lower 10/50 ratios than do nations with higher wages at the bottom end. 
Of course, many nations with higher minimum wages also suffer higher rates of unemployment. 
But unemployment is not highly correlated with 10/50 ratios (or gini coefficients) across OECD 
nations, largely because those nations with the lowest fractions of low-wage workers have 
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generous income transfer systems which provide low-income, unemployed workers with high net 
disposable incomes (see also Gustafsson and Johansson 1997; Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997). 
Similarly, the relationship between cash social transfers to the nonaged and low incomes 
as measure by the 10/50 ratio is also strong (Figure 3).6  Countries that spend less on their safety 
nets suffer higher levels of inequality as measured by the 10/50 ratio. Social insurance against 
falls in consumption due to illness and other factors are not widely available in many middle-
income countries (e.g., see Gertler and Gruber 2002, on Indonesia). Social benefits also have 
fallen drastically in both value and frequency in most transition economies of Central Europe.  
Thus, Mexico and Russia are just two examples of what one would find were we able to extend 
this chart to other middle-income nations. 
Other explanations for differences in incomes and inequality across nations are many and 
complex, especially as they affect incomes at the top of the distribution. First, consider the 
arguments that the United States is richer than other nations because it is more efficient. Jencks 
(2002) recently addressed this question using LIS data and OECD data, summarized in Table 2. 
He concludes that one major reason the United States is richer is because we employ more 
people who work longer hours than do their counterparts, in say Germany or France. When he 
corrects Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita for hours worked, and labor force 
participation, GDP per hour is actually about the same in the United States than in Germany or 
France. Correcting for unemployment, by adding the total number of hours unemployed workers 
in these countries want to work—even if unemployed (GDP per available hour)—does not 
change this result. 
While these data say nothing about inequality, per se, the number of hours worked is 
clearly an important ingredient for measured inequality (just as the distribution of wage rates are 
important). But other studies of Germany and the United States (Devroye and Freeman 2001), 
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and a set of countries including Canada and Germany (Jacobs and Gornick 2001), indicates that 
not only do United States workers work more hours overall, but high-income United States 
workers work many more hours per year than do their counterparts in other nations. Moreover, 
high-income United States workers are more likely to be married to spouses who also work 
multiple hours than in other nations (Jacobs and Gornick 2001). While the effects of these 
differences are yet to be completely and systematically worked out, the amount of work effort at 
each end of the distribution, as well as the reward for that work, are both clearly important. And 
it appears that both the rich and the poor in the United States work more hours than do their 
counterparts in other rich nations (Osberg 2002).  
Closely tied to the number of hours worked and earnings are demographic differences in 
household composition across nations. In general, nations with relatively higher levels of 
immigrants and relatively more single parents will have greater inequalities, especially at the 
lower end of the income distribution, than do nations which have fewer single parents and lower 
levels of immigration, all else equal. But the fraction of elderly households in a nation does not 
affect income distribution comparisons across countries largely because the elderly have levels 
of inequality that are similar to those of the nonelderly (Osberg 2000). Casual comparisons of the 
high immigrant, high single-parent, Anglo–Saxon countries (e.g., Canada, Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States) with central and northern Europe tend to bear out this finding 
well. 
Other factors are less easily accounted for. Many authors find that labor market 
institutions, especially collective bargaining, wage setting, levels, and penetration of minimum 
wages, are important for determining the level of inequality in wages and earnings across nations 
(Gustafsson and Johansson 1997; Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997). Differences in educational 
attainment are also important as the better educated earn more than the less well-educated, all 
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else equal, in every country (see Rehme 2002a, 2002b; Smeeding and Sullivan 1998). But recent 
evidence suggests that it is the former (institutions) rather than the latter (skills per se) that is 
more important in explaining differences in the cross-section. Blau and Kahn (2001) find that 
workers within single categories of education and adult test scores in the United States (e.g., high 
school graduates with median level skills as measured by the OECD individual adult cognitive 
literacy survey), have distributions of wages and earnings which differ amongst themselves by 
more than does the entire distribution of wages differ (across all skill and education groupings) 
in Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden. The differences in wage setting institutions across 
countries therefore account for many of the differences in pay that we find at any point in time. 
Finally, consider the arguments of Frank and Cook’s (1996) book, The Winner Take All 
Society. In an increasingly global economy, where markets are ever widening, where pay is tied 
to output and productivity—not only for chief executives and business men, but for professionals 
(like lawyers, physicians, and scientists) as well, and where labor and firms can migrate to the 
highest profit areas, we expect that the wage distribution at the top of the market will continue to 
widen, as it has in some nations, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, but now 
also in Sweden, Germany, France, and Canada. 
 Summary 
There exists a wide range of inequalities across the nations of the rich world and the rich 
nations of the G-20 as well, though the range across the rich G-20 members is narrower because 
the high equality nations of Scandinavia and Northern Europe are not represented. And adding 
the comparable data we have on Russia and Mexico, not to mention fairly comparable data for 
Argentina and Brazil, suggests that even wider ranges of inequality are found as we move down 
the development ladder to the ‘middle-income’ nations. 
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The explanations of these differences at a point in time are many, and to quote one article 
on this topic, there is no one “smoking gun” explanation. Public policies toward the poor and 
jobless, the multiple institutions of the labor market, levels of education and training, 
demographic differences and even hours worked, all can play a role in explaining these 
differences at a point in time.  
But, regardless of these differences, economies are not fixed but rather dynamic and ever 
changing, as this conference attests. Hence explanations of the trends in inequality across nations 
may be more important than explaining levels of inequality at any point in time. Certainly, the 
literature on this topic suggests that trends in inequality of both earnings and income are more 
readily studied and across a wider range of nation, even if the data used to make these studies is 
not the best we have available (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001). 
 
IV.  Trends in Inequality 
 Do the differences in inequality in OECD countries in the late 1980s and 1990s reflect 
convergence to a common level of inequality or are the less equal countries (the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Russia, and Mexico) becoming even less equal? To answer these questions, 
we compare recent trends in inequality (from 1979 onwards). Because the LIS data cover only 
two to five data points in each nation, we also rely on published and unpublished data from other 
sources to assess the trend in income inequality (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997, 2000; 
Gottschalk, Gustafsson, and Palmer 1997; Förtser 2000; Atkinson and Brandolini 2001; 
Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995; Atkinson 2000) to analyze differences across rich 
nations. 
 While differences in units, income measures, equivalence adjustments and other factors in 
different studies make it difficult to compare levels of inequality across these studies, trends in 
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inequality will be more comparable than are differences, as long as income concepts, surveys 
(and their methodologies) and inequality measures remain constant within countries over time 
(Gottschalk and Smeeding 2000). Unfortunately, nations do not always follow this rule. But 
taking advantage of a series of adjustments when assessing the trend in income inequality within 
any single nation and across nations, we are able to piece together a rather robust story for the 
rich nations of the world (Atkinson, Brandolini, and Smeeding 2001; Smeeding and Grodner 
2000). 
 As we begin this investigation, one should be warned that we are assessing mainly 
differences within the rich nations of then G-20 and to a much lesser extent the differences 
among the middle-income nations (Mexico and Russia) and the lower-income, but much larger 
nations, e.g., China and India with about one-third of the world’s population. The trend in global 
inequality depends not only on income distribution changes within any set of nations, but also on 
the growth of average incomes across nations. Hence, rapid economic growth within China and 
India—even when inequalities are also increasing within these nations, can drastically reduce 
world income inequality (Quah 2002; Sala-i-Martin 2002). We do not address the question of the 
rates of growth within poor nations compared to rich nations, as do others (Sala-i-Martin 2002; 
Dowrick and Akmal 2001; Dowrick and DeLong 2001). Ideally, one would want to use 
Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) to changes incomes for a comparable set of national household 
surveys into one single survey and then to compare the levels and changes in incomes for all 
respondents in every sample in all nations. However, that task is not yet accomplished, except for 
the European Countries (see Belbo and Knaus 2000). And the development of key data, such as 
directly measured PPPs for China, is needed to make this exercise even more meaningful. 
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Trends in Income Inequality Over Time—the Evidence from LIS and Elsewhere 
 In general, nations with multiple data series from different sources, and counties that 
clearly identify survey differences and changes in survey practices over time, provide the best 
sources of distributional trend comparisons. Nations with very few data points and those with not 
well-identified survey practices or concepts do not always provide accurate sources for trend 
analysis. Decisions about which nations to include and exclude, based on data quality 
considerations, should be at the forefront of the users agenda. Many of these issues have been 
raised by others (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001; Gottschalk and Smeeding 2000; Atkinson, 
Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995), so we do not delve deeper into them here. The Canberra Group 
(2001, chapter 9) offers a convenient summary of pitfalls for those who desire such a technical 
review. 
 Given these differences, we should go slowly and carefully when assessing trends in 
economic inequality across and within nations. For instance, LIS does its best to guarantee 
differences in inequality measurement at a point in time, and is less well suited for measuring 
changes in inequality over time. For most nations, LIS has few data points. Moreover, in 
choosing the best data for comparisons at a point in time, different surveys are used in different 
nations. For instance, in Germany, three different datasets have been used by LIS, and these 
three do not lend themselves easily to trend analyses. Even though LIS is careful to note when 
different datasets, income definitions, or other changes take place in national datasets, the 
availability of data alone does not guarantee its consistency over time. Over these past 20 years 
of normalizing microdata to a common definition, many of the cautions urged above have been 
learned from trying to assess inequality trends using LIS. Survey practices and data quality have 
changed in most of the countries found in Table 1. In some cases, a new survey replaces the old 
(Australia 1994). In others, panel datasets (Luxembourg and Germany), which provide the LIS 
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cross-sections, have suffered from sample attrition and some have not added new immigrants to 
their original samples for LIS. Many nations provide income distribution trend data, based on 
national definitions of income that include income items not included in LIS income such as 
capital gains (Sweden), and imputed rent (the Netherlands), while several others typically 
exclude near cash income such as food stamps in the United States. Finally, the weighted sum 
total of aggregate incomes taken from the surveys in several countries may be substantially 
below somewhat comparable aggregate national incomes suggesting that income underreporting 
may be a serious issue (e.g., Italy, Spain; see Smeeding, Rainwater, and Burtless 2001). While 
the changes found in LIS may be reasonable, they should be compared to those from other 
sources, which are designed to produce more accurate trend data. 
 The data on trends in income inequality have grown dramatically in recent years. When the 
Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995) report was published, there was evidence that among 
16-18 countries observed during the 1970s and 1980s, the trend in inequality observed from 
comparable gini coefficients could be separated into two eras (Table 3, first and second 
columns). From the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, inequality increased in only the United 
Kingdom and the United States, falling modestly in seven other nations and having no trend in 
nine others. These increases in the United States and the United Kingdom were in marked 
contrast to the falling inequality in both nations from 1950-1970 (Gottschalk and Smeeding 
2000). There were no suitable and accurate data in seven other nations for the 1970s or 1980s 
(see ‘na’ in first and second columns Table 3). 
 By the time the 1980s were finished (middle column, Table 3), inequality was falling 
significantly only in Italy, but was increasing in nine nations, while eight experienced no change, 
where a change in measure of plus or minus 1 percent in a given measure is taken as an 
insignificant change. Inequality in the United Kingdom increased by over 15 percent over this 
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period, while inequality in the United States rose by about 12 percent. Inequality either stopped 
declining or rose modestly in all of the other nations shown here during the 1980s. 
 Finally, a combination of results for 25 nations are shown in the last column of Table 3, 
using LIS, and similar summaries of other national trends based on data collected by the OECD 
(Förster 2000), by Atkinson (2000) and from recent national reports. Here we see that from the 
late 1980s to the mid to late 1990s inequality rose in almost every OECD nation, with Denmark 
being the only possible exception. Large increases were experienced by only two nations, and by 
the late 1990s inequality increases had become more tempered in the United Kingdom, and also 
in the United States. These trends may in time, to be shown to have been a result of the strong 
labor markets and low unemployment in these nations, during the latter half of the 1990s. 
 But inequality has begun to increase in Canada, France, and Germany in the 1990s, where 
before this time it had not risen. Russian and Czech inequality began to rise in the 1990s as one 
might expect given the suppression of market earnings distributions under the institutions of the 
former Soviet regime. However these changes have been accompanied by very different starting 
and ending points in these two nations (see Figure 1 where Czech inequality is .259 in 1996, and 
Russian inequality is .447 in 1995). New Zealand’s inequality continued to rise as well. Thus, the 
patterns change considerably as we move from period to period. 
 Because pictures are often easier to fathom than are strings of “++” and “--”, Figure 4 
provides a snapshot of inequality trends in seven nations. The basic diagram is taken from 
Atkinson (2000) with later year data adjustments by the present author from the same sources, 
where available. The data confirm the patterns seen in Table 3, and also suggest a slowing, but 
not a reversal, of rising inequality in several nations at the end of the 1990s. However, they also 
show a rise in Canadian inequality as the 1990s draw to a close. 
 The following summary impressions can be gleaned from Table 3 and Figure 4: 
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• The OECD study (Förster 2000) focused on the 1980s that were a period of transition 
from one period (flat or declining inequality) to another period (rising inequality) in 
most nations. As Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) argue, this best describes a “U”-
shaped change in the distributions of income in most nations with inequality falling in 
the 1960s (few comparable observations), and early 1970s, but then rising from the late 
1970s and 1980s into the 1990s. The turning points (bottom of the “U”) differ across 
nations. Many (e.g., the Scandinavian nations) did not experience a rise in inequality 
until the 1990s. And in many nations (e.g., Germany, France, and Canada) these 
increases have so far been very modest (see Gottschalk and Smeeding 2000, for more 
on the “U” shape). 
• While inequality rose rapidly in the United Kingdom and the United States during the 
1980s and early 1990s, the trend seems to have flattened out in both countries by the 
end of the decade. To the extent that the United Kingdom income distribution source 
(Family Expenditure Survey) and United States source (Current Population Survey) do 
not accurately capture or measure incomes in high-income households (due to top 
coding, non-response, etc.), this conclusion may be unwarranted (e.g., see 
Congressional Budget Office 2001, for the United States 1979-1997; and Jencks 2002). 
However, the rate of increase in inequality has still slowed markedly in these two 
nations in the late 1990s. 
• LIS data for Mexico and Russia shows much more volatility than do the other datasets. 
Inequality in Mexico was lower in the late 1980s than in 1990s but inequality was 
much higher in both 1994 (gini of .496) and 1998 (.494) than in 1996 (.477), perhaps 
due to cyclical volatility. And several studies (e.g., Hölscher 2001) based on LIS and 
other data argue for rapidly rising inequality in Russia in the 1990s.7 Other world 
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pictures are somewhat more mixed. For instance, Sala-i-Martin (2002, Appendix 
figures) taken from the World Bank data compiled by Deininger and Squire (1996) 
suggests that inequality rose in China and Indonesia, but not in India, Brazil, or 
Pakistan over the 1970-1997 period. The refinement of these analyses must await better 
data and methods (e.g., Deininger and Squire 2002). 
 What Changed and Why? 
 
 The estimates in Table 3 and Figure 4 provide an overall picture of changing inequality, but 
one that needs to be carefully interpreted. For instance, suppose that one weights changes in 
inequality at the bottom of the distribution more than changes at the top? If so, one would be 
happy to learn that overall changes in relative poverty, e.g., the percent with incomes less than 40 
or 50 percent of the adjusted (for family size) median were far less frequent and were of lesser 
magnitude than were increases in overall inequality in rich OECD nations (Smeeding, Rainwater, 
and Burtless 2001). That is, in most of the European countries studied here and in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, relative poverty did not increase by much if at all, during the 
1990s. Thus, the phenomenon of increasing inequality is predominately a consequence of 
changes in the top of the distribution, rather than in the bottom (Förster 2000). 
 The data say nothing about tradeoffs between economic growth and inequality in rich 
nations. Though much has been written on this topic in recent years, there is no compelling case 
for one being systematically related to the other in OECD nations (e.g., see Arjona, Pearson, and 
Ladaique 2001, for a concise summary of studies in OECD nations). In fact, in some rapidly 
growing nations, such as Ireland, a modest increase in inequality can be seen as a small price to 
pay for rapid economic growth in real incomes and falling poverty at all levels of the income 
distribution (Nolan 2001). Similarly, modest increases in inequality may be the price that needs 
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to be paid by countries such as Canada, France, Germany, and Australia, as they adjust to greater 
trade and the increased capita and labor mobility that accompanies globalizing economies. 
 Finally, the question is raised whether increases in inequality were accompanied by 
widespread or selective changes in real economic well being within each nation. The question of 
whether all the boats rose or only some, while others sank, is clearly a critical one for most 
nations. As in Ireland, rising inequalities are much more acceptable when living standards are 
rising across all segments of the population than when they are concentrated among the rich 
alone. While we are trying to compile these data for a number of countries, the experience of the 
United States is one which other countries might chose not to emulate in this regard.8  Figure 5 
suggests that America experienced several distinctly different periods of income inequality 
change during the past 50 years: first, one of falling inequality and widespread real income gains 
largely in concert for all families from roughly 1950s through the mid 1970s; second, one where 
real income growth was increasingly different depending on where one lies in the income 
distribution from the 1970’s onward. And within this latter period we note two different epochs. 
While average family incomes grew during the 1980s, and especially the period from 1993 
onward (albeit reflecting the cyclical changes of the 1991-1993 recession), higher incomes grew 
by much more than did lower incomes throughout the period. Lower incomes fell from 1979 
until 1993 before rising markedly in the later 1990s. Still, by the end of the 1990s, the average 
income for families in the bottom fifth of the distribution had barely reached the real standard of 
living experienced at the end of the 1970s, despite the real income gains for all during the latter 
1990s. 
 Explanations for why income inequality changed in rich nations are many and, as seen in 
the data for the United States, can be very complicated as well. Many of these comparisons are 
based on LIS data (Rehme 2002a, 2002b; Acemoglu 2002; Gustafsson and Johansson 1997). 
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Others are based on series of national datasets (Förster 2000; Arjona, Pearson, and Ladaique 
2001). Still others concentrate on earnings changes alone and are not based on changes in overall 
incomes, after taxes and transfers (Card and DiNardo 2002; Beaudry and Green 2000). 
 First, it is important to establish what these studies do not show, i.e., that increasing levels 
of international trade can be tied to growth in inequality. To quote Friedman (2000), patterns of 
change in wages and earnings are not determined in Beijing, but are a product of a complex set 
of interactions within and across nations. More likely, the effect of international trade on the 
economy is proportionate to the size of the trade sector in each nation (Richardson 1995). Studies 
that have tried to establish this connection using LIS data have concluded that greater levels of 
trade do not lead to increased poverty or inequality (e.g., Gustafsson and Johnsson 1997; Osberg 
and Sharpe 2000; Osberg 2000). 
 There is, however, evidence that both the changing supply and demand for labor of 
different skills can explain some of the changes in earned incomes across rich nations, and 
possibly among middle-income ones as well. The rising demand for skill led to higher (lower) 
wages in countries that had smaller (larger) responses in their education (supply) sectors. Thus, 
Canada and the Netherlands experienced much smaller increases in high wages than did the 
United States or the United Kingdom (Gottschalk and Joyce 1997). Institutional mechanisms 
have also slowed the rewards to higher skills in many European nations, at least early into the 
1990s (Katz and Autor 2000). And there is new evidence that the demand for skills increased 
faster than the supply in middle-income nations as well, (Berman and Machin 2001) and in 
Mexico (Legovoni, Bouillon, and Lustig 2002), thus exacerbating earned income inequality. 
 It is more difficult to tie these explanations to “skill biased technological change” or to 
“demand side effects” as various sectors of the economy have experienced different levels of 
technological change in each country as well as across countries. Different practices of 
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management, different national climates, and institutions for promoting for entrepreneurship, the 
differential availability of venture capital, and diffusion of technological progress are also 
apparent throughout the OECD world (e.g., Förster 2000; OECD 2001). Better identification of 
demand side effects is certainly needed. For instance, an interesting new paper by Acemoglu 
(2002) argues that wage compression in Europe might have led to a more rapid adoption of 
technology that benefited low-skill workers than in other countries. 
 Moreover, no one has yet documented the effects of increased changes in product quality or 
the effect of falling international prices for traded goods due to greater international competition 
amongst the rich nations. Our textbooks tell us that trade and comparative advantage bring a 
better standard of living (more real income) to each nation, but the research that we have so far 
reviewed has not addressed the size of these gains as of this writing. 
 Summary of Trend Analyses 
 It appears that the quality and quantity of consistent and good quality information on 
income distribution trends is on the rise. Recent work by Atkinson (2000), Atkinson and 
Brandolini (2001), the Canberra Group (2001), and the Förster (2000), in conjunction with LIS, 
has made some headway into the issue, but much needs to be done to produce more consistent 
and comparable measures of income inequality in most of the middle income countries and in 
some of the rich ones. To the extent that these data emerge, we will be in a better position to 
model the determinants of changes in inequality and to understand its evolution on a worldwide 
scale.  
 As Atkinson (2000) concludes, rising economic inequality is not inevitable—Denmark 
seem to present at least one exception to the rule. However, rising income inequality is 
predominant in most nations, even the most egalitarian advanced welfare state nations of the 
world. And while inequality has increased, our reading of the LIS data, and to a lesser extent the 
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international trend data, suggest that there have been different patterns in the timing and extent of 
the increase in inequality in most nations. Moreover, national changes in inequality may have 
different welfare implications depending on whose incomes are changing. In Sweden, Germany, 
Norway, and Finland, most of the higher inequality in the 1990s seems to be coming from 
movements at the top of the distribution (from changes in P90’s), not from changes in the bottom 
(i.e., from the P10’s; see Gottschalk and Smeeding 2000). And most rich countries have been able 
to protect the least skilled from the negative effects of rapidly changing industrial and 
employment effects brought about by increased trade and technological change. At least in 
theory, the winners from the globalization game should be able to compensate the losers to the 
benefit of all. And the strong welfare states of Europe and Scandinavia seem to have been able to 
protect their least skilled and least well off citizens better than have many others during this 
period. 
 That said, only a few authors have begun to sort out the sources of differences in inequality 
trends across the rich countries, and even fewer in the middle income and poorer nations. Much 
additional work is needed here. 
 
V.  Summary and Conclusions 
 This brief paper has perhaps asked more questions than it has given answers. This is how 
the paper was meant to be written. Understandings and explanations of changes in the broad 
structures of economic inequality within and across nations depend heavily on the quality of the 
data that we have at our disposal. For social scientists interested in this topic, economic 
inequality data is equivalent to the astronomer’s Hubbell telescope or the geneticist’s Human 
Genome project. Without accurate indicators, model building and hypothesis testing cannot 
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adequately proceed. Cross-national data on income distribution will never be perfect. But the 
ratio of signal to noise in these data can still be improved, as the LIS project has demonstrated. 
And there is room for the non-LIS G-20 nations to create similar datasets to illustrate changing 
economic inequality in their nations as well.  
 The evidence that we do have suggests that globalization is one force among many which 
for widening income inequalities in the rich countries of the OECD. The relationship between 
economic inequality and growth has not been sorted out, even in the rich nations, and we have 
yet to determine the effect of very high levels of inequality on civic engagement, or on support 
for policies which enhance opportunity for all citizens. Still globalization in rich nations appears 
to act more by raising incomes at the top of the income distribution than by lowering them at the 
bottom. Notwithstanding, this influence, however, domestic policies—labor market institutions, 
welfare policies, etc.—can act as a powerful countervailing force to market driven inequality. 
Even a globalized world, the overall distribution of income in a country remains very much a 
consequence of the domestic political, institutional and economic choices made by those 
individual countries—both rich and middle income ones. 
 
. 
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Endnotes 
1. The “Canberra Group” of National Statistical Offices and Organizations (including LIS, 
the World Bank, the United Nations and others) produced its final report on international, 
standards for income distributions last year. See Canberra Report (2001) or 
www.lisproject.org for a summary of all of the Canberra meetings and the final report 
 
2. The United Kingdom data is the only exception to this rule as their Family Expenditure 
Survey (FES) uses a bi-weekly accounting period with rules for aggregating up to annual 
totals. In Germany, LIS has aggregated the monthly and quarterly data into annual 
income amounts. 
 
3. However, for Sweden and Canada more restrictive nuclear family (Sweden) and 
economic family (Canada) definitions of the accounting unit are necessary (see Atkinson, 
Rainwater, Smeeding 1995, Chapter 2, for additional details). 
 
4. For more on absolute or “real” income differences, see Rainwater and Smeeding (1999) 
and Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000). 
 
5. Topcoding is the procedure by which nation place a maximum value on reported incomes 
in the public release version of a survey. In countries with rapidly growing high incomes, 
arbitrary topcodes can have serious effects on measured inequality (e.g., Smeeding and 
Grodner 2000). 
 
6.  Here we have excluded transfers to the elderly, but even when they are included, the 
same relationship holds (see Smeeding 1998; Smeeding, Rainwater, and Burtless 2001). 
 
7. However because the Mexican and Russian surveys are taken a over a period of several 
months when inflation can be rapid, the estimates of annual inequality for each nation 
may be sensitive to the treatment of changes in domestic prices over this period. 
 
8.   Figure 5 is based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s income series for families of two or more 
persons (thus omitting unrelated individuals), unadjusted for taxes paid, but gross of 
transfers received. It is therefore a less complete income concept and population group 
than the one studied by LIS. However restricting ourselves to this definition buys a more 
or less consistent 50-year series of incomes and income inequality. We are currently 
trying to develop a series that is both consistent with LIS and with national survey 
practices, measures of price change, etc., for several countries. 
 
Country 10/50 Ratios Rank Rank Rank
United States 38 17 3.7 15 25.0 1
Italy 42 16 7.0 12 n/a n/a
Australia 45 15 6.2 14 13.8 5
Japan 46 12 1.9 16 15.7 4
Canada 46 12 8.0 11 23.2 2
United Kingdom 46 12 9.4 9 19.6 3
Spain 50 11 6.8 13 n/a n/a
Netherlands 55 4 14.1 2 11.9 8
Sweden 60 1 13.8 3 5.2 13
Germany 55 4 8.4 10 13.3 6
Switzerland 52 9 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Denmark 51 10 12.4 4 n/a n/a
France 54 7 10.7 6 13.3 6
Norway 55 4 10.1 8 7.8 9
Finland 59 2 15.3 1 5.9 12
Belgium 53 8 12.1 5 7.2 10
Luxembourg 59 2 10.4 7 6.0 11
Mexico 28 19 1.8 18 n/a n/a
Russia 30 18 1.9 17 n/a n/a
Overall Average 48.6 8.6 12.9
Notes: 
1Cash and non-cash social expenditures exclude health, education, and social services, but include all forms of cash benefits and 
near cash housing subsidies, active labor market program subsidies and other contingent cash and other near cash benefits.
Source: OECD (2001a) (non-elderly and cash and near-cash social expenditure level); OECD (1996) (percent of full-time workers 
earnings less than 65 percent of median earnings); and authors' tabulations of the LIS data files.
Table A-1
Poverty Rates for Children (Persons Under 18), Non-elderly and Cash and Near-Cash Social Expenditure Levels,
and Percent of Full-time Workers Earning Less than 65% of Median Earnings
Non-elderly 
and Cash 
and Near-
Cash 
Social 
Percent of 
full-time 
workers 
earnings 
less than 
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Rank Country Year Gini
A. Latin America
1 Brazil1 1996 .571
2 Mexico 1995 .494
4 Argentina1 1996 .442
Average .502
B. Anglo OECD Countries
5 United States 1997 .372
6 United Kindom 1995 .344
9 Australia 1994 .311
10 Canada 1998 .305
Average .333
C. European OECD Countries
7 Italy 1995 .342
11 France 1994 .288
12 Germany 1994 .261
Average .297
D. Eastern Europe
3 Russia 1995 .447
E. Asia
8 Japan2 1992 .315
Notes on Sources:
1  from IDB, Szekely and Hilgert (1999a, 1999b).
2 from Smeeding (1998).
All others from LIS database.
Table 1.  Income Distribution in 12 G-20 Nations
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United States United Kindom Australia Canada France Germany
90/10 ratio 5.6 4.6 4.3 4.1 3.5 3.2
OECD: GD $32,184 $21,673 $24,192 $25,179 $21,132 $23,010
Pct of popu 49 46 46 47 38 44
Hours per w 1,864 1,731 1,860 1,779 1,567 1,510
GDP per w $60,106 $44,280 $47,558 $49,007 $55,714 $50,616
GDP per ho $32.25 $25.58 $25.57 $27.55 $35.55 $33.52
GDP per "a $30.81 $23.65 $23.51 $25.26 $31.38 $30.38
Efficiency (1998)
Source: Jencks (2002); OECD, and LIS.
Note: GDP converted to US dollars using purchasing power parity, not exchange rate.
Table 2. Economic Inequality, Output, Effort, and Efficiency in Six Rich G-20 Democracies in the late 1990s
Inequality (1994-97)
Output (1998)
Effort (1998)
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Mid/Early 1970s OECD Study Mid/Late 1980s
to 1980s to
Mid/Late 1980s ( ) = other estimate Mid/Late 1990s
Australia 0 + +
Austria 0 0 + +
Belgium 0 + +
Canada - 0 +
Czech Republic na na + + +
Denmark na na -
Finland - 0 +
France - 0 +
Germany - + +
Hungary na na + +
Ireland - 0 + +
Israel 0 0 + +
Italy - - - + +
Japan 0 + + +
Mexico na na + +
Netherlands 0 + + +
New Zealand 0 + + + +
Norway 0 0 + +
Poland na na + +
Russia na na + +
Sweden - + +
Switzerland na na +
Taiwan 0 0 +
United Kingdom + + + + + + +
United States + + + + + +
+ + +
+ +
+
0
-
- -
- - -
na
Table 3. Overall Trends in Income Distribution:
Summary Results from National and Cross-national Studies
Significant rise in income inequality (more than 15 percent increase)
Rise in income inequality (7 to 15 percent increase)
Modest rise in income inequality (1 to 6 percent increase)
No consistent estimate available.
General Note: The results are based on several income inequality indicators, mainly gini coefficients, in 
most countries and reflect the general trends reported in national and comparative studies. However, 
trends are always sensitive to beginning and ending points as well as to other cautions mentioned in 
the Atkinson, Brandolini and Smeeding (2001).
Sources and Notes: Forster (2000); LIS (www.lisproject.org/keyfigures/) Atkinson, Rainwater and 
Smeeding (1995); Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997, 2000), Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), Fukui 
(2001); Atkinson (2000); Statistics Canada (2002).
No change (-1 to =1 percent change)
Modest decrease in income inequality (1 to 6 percent decrease)
Decrease in income inequality (7 to 15 percent decrease)
Significant decrease in income inquality (more than 15 percent decrease)
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Figure 1.  Decile Ratios and Gini Coefficient for Adjusted Disposable Income in 26 Nations
(numbers given are percent of median in each nation and Gini coefficient)
P10 P90 P90/P10 Gini
(Low Income) (High Income) (Decile Ratio) Coefficient1
Sweden 1995 60 156 2.61 .221
Finland 1995 59 159 2.68 .226
Norway 1995 55 157 2.83 .238
Luxembourg 1994 59 173 2.92 .235
Czech Republic 1996 59 179 3.01 .259
Netherlands 1994 55 173 3.15 .253
Denmark 1997 51 162 3.15 .257
Germany 19942 55 174 3.18 .261
Belgium 1997 53 173 3.26 .255
Taiwan 1995 56 189 3.38 .277
France 19942 54 191 3.54 .288
Switzerland 1992 52 188 3.62 .307
Austria 1995 48 179 3.73 .277
Spain 1990 50 197 3.96 .303
Poland 1995 47 189 4.04 .318
Canada 19982 46 188 4.13 .305
Japan 19922,3 46 192 4.17 .315
Hungary 1994 50 209 4.19 .323
Ireland 1987 49 209 4.23 .328
Australia 19942 45 195 4.33 .311
United Kingdom 19952 46 210 4.57 .344
Italy 19952 42 202 4.77 .342
Israel 1997 43 210 4.86 .336
United States 19972 38 214 5.57 .372
Russia 19952 30 282 9.39 .447
Mexico 19982 28 328 11.55 .494
Average4 49 195 4.26 0.304
Source: Author's calculations from Luxembourg Income Study.
2G-20 country.
4Simple average.
3Japanese gini coefficient as calculated in Smeeding (1998) from 1993 Japanese Survey of Income Redistribution.
(Decile Ratios and Gini Coefficent for Adjusted Disposable Income)
Length of bars represents the gap
tween high and low income individu
1Gini coefficients are based on incomes which are bottom coded at 1 percent of disposable income and top coded at 10 times the median 
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Figure 2. Relationship of Low Pay and 10/50 Ratios in 
Thirteen Industrialized Countries in the 1990s
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Source: OECD (1996) (percent of full-time workers earnings less than 65 percent of median earnings); authors' tabulations of the LIS data files, except for 
Japan, whose source is Smeeding (2002). See Apendix Table A-1 for values.
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Source: OECD (2001a) (non-elderly and cash and near-cash social expenditure level); and authors' tabulations of the LIS data files, except for Japan, 
which source is Smeeding (1998). Cash and non-cash social expenditures exclude health, education, and social services, but include all forms of cash 
benefits and near cash housing subsidies, active labor market program subsidies and other contingent cash and other near cash benefits. Non-elderly 
benefits include only those accruing to household head under age 65. See Appendix Table A-1 for data.
Figure 3.  Relationship of Cash Social Expenditures for the Non-elderly and 10/50 Ratios in Eighteen 
Countries in the 1990s
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Sources: Atkinson (2000); Canada, Statistics Canada (2002); United States, US Department of
Commerce (2002: Table B-3, B-6); Hauser and Wagner (2002); Hauser and Becker (2000); Forster
(2000).
Figure 4.
Changes in Income Inequality
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Source: Burtless and Smeeding (2001). Incomes are for families only, before tax, and are deflated by the CPI-UX1 price index.
Figure 5.  Trend in Real Average Family Income, by Rank in the Income Distribution, 
        1947-1998
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